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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case is about the appropriate remedy to be applied in the case of a breach by the 
purchaser of a contract to purchase real estate. Rather than award the standard measure of 
damages recognized by this Court - the difference between the contract price and the value of 
the real estate at the time of breach - the District Court ordered specific performance of the 
contract. The District Court's order of specific performance is erroneous in that it ignored two 
fundamental rules of equity: (1) that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including 
specific performance, that is not feasible; and (2) that equity will not intervene where the 
aggrieved party has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law. 
B. Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
1. Bac\{ground Of Mr. Mason 
Mr. Mason has been developing and building single-family and multi-family 
communities in Idaho for seventeen years. Since 1990, he has been involved in the development 
of approximately 30 single-family subdivisions and 8 multi-family projects. Each of those 
subdivisions/projects involved some element of bank or investor financing. See R., Exh. I 
(sealed)! (Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~ 3). 
2. The Agreements To Purchase The Subject Properties, And Mr. Mason's 
Breach Of Those Agreements 
Many of the facts relevant to this case are taken from Mr. Mason's financial records, which 
are confidential in nature and are subject to a Protective Order entered by the District Court. 
The affidavits setting forth confidential financial information were filed under seal with the 
District Court and have been lodged with this Court as part of a sealed record. 
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On April 12, 2006, Mr. Mason entered into two separate Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreements. See R., Exh. 2 (Affidavit of Frank 1. Fazzio, Jr., ~~ 2-3). The first Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that Mr. Mason would purchase a residence and a parcel 
of real property on which the residence is located from Respondents Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio for the 
price of$1,530,000. Id. The second Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that 
Mr. Mason would purchase two parcels of real property consisting offarmland from Respondent 
Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, for the price of $2,000,000. Id. at ~ 4. Each Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement provided for a closing date of February 26, 2007. ld. Mr. Mason 
was not able to close on the purchase of the properties on February 26,2007. ld. at ~ 6. Thus, 
Mr. Mason was in breach of both Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreements as of that date. 
The parties subsequently entered into two separate Agreements to Resolve Dispute 
Arising Out of Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement Dated April 12, 2006 (the" Agreements 
to Purchase the Subject Properties").2 ld. at ~ 9, Exhs. A-B. The Agreements to Purchase the 
Subject Properties provided that they superseded the original Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreements. ld. The terms of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Propeliies required 
Mr. Mason to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties by December 21, 2007 if Mason 
obtained plat approval by that date from the city of Kuna. Id. If plat approval was not obtained 
by December 21, 2007, then Mr. Mason was required to close by March 21, 2008. ld. The city 
of Kuna approved the preliminary plat prior to December 21,2007, but Mr. Mason was not able 
2 The properties that are the subject of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties are 
the same properties Mr. Mason had previously agreed to purchase and will hereinafter be 
referred to as the "Subject Properties." 
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to close on the purchase of the properties. Id. at ~ 11. Thus, Mr. Mason was in breach of the 
Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as of December 21, 2007. 
3. Mr. Mason's Inability To Close On The Purchase Of The Subject Properties 
At all times during the negotiations for the purchase of the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason 
believed that he would be able to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. The real estate 
market in Idaho was strong and bank and/or investor financing for real estate developments was 
readily available. Subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, however, 
there has been a significant downturn in the Idaho real estate market, property values have fallen, 
and the availability of financing for real estate developments has decreased substantially. See 
R., Exh. 1 (sealed) (Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~~ 5-6). 
At all times subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason 
has made diligent efforts to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, he simply 
has been unable to do so because he cannot obtain the necessary financing. Attempts have been 
made to obtain financing from many different sources. See id. at 7-8. 
The original plan was to obtain financing through First Horizon Construction Lending 
("First Horizon"). First Horizon initiated an appraisal on the Subject Property, which indicated 
an "infeasibility issue with the project, in that the costs to acquire/develop exceed values 
generated." Furthermore, with the downturn in the Idaho real estate market, the Boise office of 
First Horizon closed in December 2007, laying off all employees, including its loan manager. 
Before going out of business in December 2007, after extensive financial documentation and 
meetings, First Horizon approved a financing package that required a high equity position. First 
Horizon agreed to finance just over $1,800,000 of the purchase price. When Mr. Mason was 
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unable to obtain an equity partner for the remainder of the purchase price, he informed 
Dr. Fazzio of the situation and requested that he agree to carry a portion of the financing through 
an owner-financing arrangement. Dr. Fazzio refused. See id. at 9. 
In January 2008, First Horizon announced that it was closing its national construction 
lending division and all pending loan financing was terminated. Thus, financing through First 
Horizon is no longer a viable option. See id. at 10-11. 
Mr. Mason also attempted to obtain financing through Eagle Equity Group, which is an 
investor group that has helped finance some ofMr. Mason's other developments. The Eagle 
Equity Group declined to finance the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 12. 
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through the RBC Builder Financial Group, 
which helped finance the acquisition and development of the Galiano Subdivision, a subdivision 
Mr. Mason is developing adjacent to the Subject Property. RBC informed Mr. Mason that no 
additional financing of a large subdivision would be approved due to the excess lot inventory and 
poor market conditions in the area. RBC annonnced in March 2008 that it was closing its 
western offices and that it would only have ongoing U.S. operations in the Southeast and Texas. 
Thus, financing in Idaho through the RBC is no longer available. See id. at 13. 
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Fred Berman, who has invested in 
many of his developments. Mr. Berman declined to invest in the project. See id. at 14. 
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Magnet Bank, which is currently 
financing one of his developments, the Ambleside subdivision. The Magnet Bank declined to 
help finance the purchase of the Subject Properties due to the depressed market conditions and 
the excess lot inventory and current financing of the Ambleside subdivision. In November 2007, 
-4-
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the Eagle Magnet Bank was shut down overnight with employees arriving to locked doors. See 
id. at 15. 
In February 2008, Mr. Mason attended a National Association of Homebuilders 
convention. Mr. Mason presented information regarding the financing of the Subject Properties 
to various banking and investor professionals attending the conference. He encountered a 
general lack of financing available for development projects due to the depressed real estate and 
financial markets. The only individual who expressed interest in the project was Meg Kelley, 
who is a Commercial & Residential Loan Officer with the Patriot National Bank in Stamford, 
Connecticut, and who also has ties to several independent investors and hedge funds. See id. at 
16. 
Mr. Mason provided additional information and financial documentation to Meg Kelley, 
but the Patriot National Bank was not interested in providing financing. However, Meg Kelley 
located an investor from New York that was interested in a conference call to discuss the project. 
Ted Mason Signature Homes, Inc. staff, Meg Kelley and the investor had a conference call to 
discuss feasibility. The investor reviewed the financial ratio requirements of investment as well 
as terms. Mr. Mason is not able to satisfy these high equity-to-debt ratios or liquidity 
requirements, so the investor was not interested in investing in any project at this time with 
Mr. Mason. In further conversations with Meg Kelly, she indicated that Mr. Mason and his 
companies would need to have a stronger balance sheet before national investors would be 
interested in reviewing specific projects. See id. at 17. 
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Mr. Mason has also spoken with three other private lenders: Hopkins Financial Services; 
Excelsior Management; and Seattle Funding Group, Ltd. Each of these private lenders would 
require an equity investor, which Mr. Mason has not been able to obtain. See id. at 18. 
Mr. Mason continues to look for a way to finance the purchase of the Subject Property. 
Indeed, he would still like to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, given his 
current financial situation, the depressed real estate market and the increasingly tightened credit 
market, there is no way he can close on the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 4,19. 
Moreover, closing on the properties in question would not be made possible by 
liquidating assets. The vast majority of Mr. Mason's assets are in the form of real property, 
which serves as the collateral on bank loans. Not only would it be extremely difficult to sell that 
property under the current real estate market conditions, but in most cases Mr. Mason already 
owes the banks more than the appraised value of the property. Thus, liquidating those assets 
would not provide any cash with which to close on the properties. See R., Exh. 3 (sealed) 
(Supplemental Affidavit of Edward 1. Mason, ~~ 3-11). 
In order to close on the Idaho Livestock Company, LLC property, Mr. Mason would need 
to have cash available in the amount of $2,000,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 
In order to close on the Fazzio property, Mr. Mason would need to have cash available in the 
amount of$I,530,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Thus, the total amount of 
cash that would be required to close on the Subject Properties is well over $3.5 Million. 
Mr. Mason does not have in his possession, nor does he have access to, the over $3.5 Million that 
would be required to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. See R., Exh. I (sealed) 
(Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~ 22). 
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If this Court were to affirm the District Court's Order of specific performance ordering 
Mr. Mason to close on the Subject Property, he simply will not be able to comply with that order. 
4. Procedural Posture 
Respondents filed the Complaint on January 22, 2008. R., p. 6-68. The Complaint 
alleged that Mr. Mason breached his contractual obligations under the Agreements to Purchase 
the Subject Properties. Respondents subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking 
the Court to either (l) confirm the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as arbitration 
awards; or (2) enter a judgment for specific performance. Specifically, Respondents requested a 
"Judgment for specific performance .... [rJequiring Mason to immediately close on the 
purchase of the Subject Properties." R., Exh. 1, p. 10. 
Mr. Mason opposed the motion for summary judgment on grounds that specific 
performance should not be ordered because it would be impossible for Mr. Mason to close on the 
purchase of the subject properties. R., Exh. 2 (sealed). Mr. Mason relied on this Court's 
repeated recognition of the equitable rules that a court of equity should not order a remedy, 
including specific performance, that is not feasible and that an equitable remedy should not be 
ordered where there exists and adequate remedy at law. Mr. Mason did not contest the fact that 
he breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, nor did Mr. Mason assert the 
substantive impossibility of performance defense. Despite the fact that the substantive 
impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by Mr. Mason, the District Court, the 
Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the 
substantive impossibility of performance defense. R., Exhs. 4-5. Mr. Mason responded by 
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explaining that the substantive impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable to this case 
and is a different defense than that being asserted by Mr. Mason. R., Exh. 4. 
In a December 30, 2008 Order, Judge Sticklen granted Respondents' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, ordering that "[ s ]pecific performance on the contract is to be completed 
within thirty days of the date of this order; ifnot so accomplished, ajudgment for the purchase 
price may be entered, upon satisfaction of which the properties must be conveyed to Mason." 
R., pp. 78-83. As Mr. Mason had previously made clear, he was unable to comply with the order 
of specific performance because he did not have the means to close on the Subject Properties. 
Mr. Mason appealed from the Order, but that appeal was dismissed as premature because 
a final judgment had not yet been issued. Mr. Mason then sought reconsideration of the Order, 
which was denied by the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood, who had since replaced Judge 
Sticklen. Judge Greenwood entered a final Judgment (the "Judgment") in favor of Respondents 
Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio in the principal amount of$I,530,000, plus interest in the amount of 
$412,471.08. See Order to Augment the Record, dated November 17,2009, Exh. 1. Judge 
Greenwood also entered Judgment in favor of Respondent Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, in 
the amount of $2,000,000, plus interest in the amount of $539, 177.66. Id. The Judgment further 
provides that Respondents have a valid, subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties 
and that said vendor's liens may be enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same 
manner and subject to the same restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree 
of foreclosure as set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Id. Judge Greenwood also 
awarded attorneys' fees and costs in favor of respondents in the sum of$36,999.50. See Order 
Granting Motion to Augment Record, dated October 6, 2009. 
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II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(1) Whether the District Court erred in ordering specific performance of the 
Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, where the Respondent had an adequate remedy 
at law and where the order of specific performance was not feasible. 
(2) Whether, upon reversal of the order granting specific performance, this Court 
should also reverse the award of attorney fees on grounds that Respondent is not the prevailing 
party. 3 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review 
The Court reviews an order of specific performance for an abuse of discretion. Mallory 
v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 123,594 P.2d 629, 633 (1979). When determining whether a district 
court abused its discretion, the Court considers three factors: "(1) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its 
3 Mr. Mason had initially indicated that he would be appealing the District Court's order of 
attorney fees with regard to the amount of the attorneys' fees award. After further review of 
the issue, Mr. Mason has elected not to pursue an appeal of the reasonableness of the 
amount of the attorney fees award and to focus this appeal only on the order of specific 
performance. Upon reversal of the order of specific performance, however, Respondent will 
not be the prevailing party, and the award of attorney fees should also be reversed as 
premature. 
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decision through an exercise of reason." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 
344 (2006). 
B. The District Court Erred In Ordering Specific Performance 
1. Specific Performance Is Not Appropriate Because It Would Not Be Possible 
For Mr. Mason To Comply With The Order Of Specific Performance 
"There is no legal right to specific performance." Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc. 
134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000). Instead, specific performance "is an extraordinary 
remedy that can provide relief when legal remedies are inadequate." Id "[S]pecific 
performance is an equitable remedy and should not be granted when it would be unjust, 
oppressive, or unconscionable." Id The decision to grant specific performance is a matter 
within the District Court's discretion. Id "When making its decision the court must balance the 
equities between the parties to determine whether specific performance is appropriate." Id 
In ordering specific performance, the District Court did not recognize, much less follow, 
the well-established rule that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including specific 
performance, which is not feasible. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 125,227 P.2d 
351,359 (1951), overruled on other grounds by David Steed and Associates, Inc. v. Young, 115 
Idaho 247, 766 P.2d 717 (1988) ("Equity will not enter a decree for specific performance the 
enforcement of which is not practicable or feasible."); Faloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 
99 Idaho 740, 745-46, 588 P.2d 939, 944-45 (1978) (dismissing claim for specific performance 
because "[i]t is well established that the courts will not order the impossible"); Childs v. Reed, 34 
Idaho 450, 202 P. 685; 686 (1921) ("Where the contract is of such a nature that obedience to the 
- 10 -
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decree cannot be obtained by the ordinary processes of the court, equity will decline to 
interfere."). 
It is indisputable that Mr. Mason does not have the approximately $3.5 Million that 
would be required to close on the Subject Properties as ordered by the Court. See R., Exhs. 1, 3 
(sealed). Thus, the District Court erred in ordering specific performance. 
2. The Equitable Rule That Equity Courts Should Not Order The Impossible Is 
Separate And Distinct From The Substantive Impossibility Of Performance 
Defense 
The rule that equity should not order the impossible is an equitable rule, not a substantive 
defense. Rather than apply the equitable rule, the Court applied and rejected the substantive 
contract defense of impossibility of performance as if the two rules were one and the same. The 
District Court's analysis was erroneous in that the two rules are not one and the same. The 
equitable rule merely precludes an order of equitable relief and leaves the plaintiff with a remedy 
in law, i.e., damages. See, e.g.. Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 434 (1966) 
(reversing the district court's order of specific performance of a real estate contract, and 
remanding to the district court to calculate damages). In other words, the equitable rule cited by 
Mr. Mason goes not to the issue ofliability, but to the issue of what remedy is appropriate. The 
substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is a complete defense to a contract and leaves 
the plaintiff with no remedy at all, either equitable or at law. See Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 
252,257,706 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the substantive doctrine of 
impossibility of performance results in the party asserting the defense being "relieved of his duty 
to perform") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (1981)). 
- 11 -
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"The doctrine of impossibility operates to excuse performance when the bargained-for 
performance is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being performed due to the 
unforeseen, supervening act of a third party." Haessly v, Safeeo Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 
Idaho 463, 465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992). "A sine qua non for application of the doctrine is 
that the parties must have contracted, expressly or in necessary contemplation, with Teference to 
continued existence of the specific thing as a condition essential to performance." Id 
The above described impossibility of performance doctrine serves as a defense to a 
breach of contract claim. In other words, the impossibility of performance excuses the breach. 
However, Mr. Mason has not ever asserted impossibility of performance as a defense to 
Respondents' breach of contract claim because the authorities generally hold that financial 
inability to perform does not excuse a breach. Moreover, "impossibility that is only temporary 
will not act to discharge a contractual obligation if the contract can yet be performed after the 
impossibility ceases." Sutheimer v, Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 85, 896 P.2d 989, 993 (et. App. 
1995). Impossibility of performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is simply not 
an issue in this case. 
Despite the fact that the impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by 
Mr. Mason, Judge Sticklen asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the 
impossibility of performance doctrine in connection with Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See R., Exhs. 3-4. Mr. Mason provided supplemental briefing on the issue, 
explaining the difference between the equitable rule that equitable courts should not order the 
impossible and the substantive defense of impossibility of performance. See R., Exh. 4. 
Mr. Mason expressly stated that he was not relying on the substantive impossibility of 
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performance defense. Id. at p. 3 ("Mr. Mason is not currently asserting impossibility of 
performance as a defense to Dr. Fazzio's breach of contract claim because the authorities 
generally hold that financial inability to perform does not excuse a breach. . .. Impossibility of 
performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is not at issue for purposes of 
Dr. Fazzio's motion for summary judgment."). 
Even though Mr. Mason specifically disclaimed any reliance on the substantive 
impossibility of performance defense, Judge Sticklen proceeded to grant Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment by concluding that the substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is 
inapplicable. Specifically, she explained: 
Furthermore, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently noted that 
"[mlost importantly it is the task itself which must be impossible-
it is not enough that the particular promissor is unable to perform 
the task if it would be possible for a different promissor to 
perform." State v. Chacon, [146 Idaho 520, (Ct. App. 2008)]. 
While this case was criminal in nature, it is still persuasive Idaho 
dicta on the issue as it relates to the enforcement of contracts. 
R., p. 83; see also. id. at p. 82 (citing Christy v. Pilkington, 273 S.W. 2d 533 (Ark. 1954), for the 
proposition that the substantive defense of impossibility of performance does not apply to a 
"subjective impossibility" of performing). 
Mr. Mason does not disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the substantive 
impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable. Indeed, Mr. Mason conceded the point. 
The problem is that the District Court did not address the equitable rule that a court in equity 
should not order the impossible. 
In ordering specific performance, the District Court abused its discretion in that it applied 
the wrong legal principle. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 873 (explaining that, in 
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determining whether a district court has abused its discretion, the Court should look to whether 
the district court "acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable 
legal principles.") (emphasis added); see also State of Idaho v. Watkins, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d 
_,2009 Opinion No. 151, Docket No. 35687 (December 24,2009), wherein the Court defined 
"judicial discretion" to mean: 
the discretionary action of a judge or court ... bounded by the 
rules and principles oflaw, and not arbitrary, capricious, or 
unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, but the 
exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or 
the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the 
circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning 
the course prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of 
the judge, but to that of the law. 
Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY). 
Although applied in the context of the standard of review for evidentiary rulings, the 
principles guiding the exercise of judicial discretion in determining an equitable remedy should 
be the same. The District Court did not recognize, much less apply, the equitable rule that a 
court in equity should not order the impossible. Rather, the District Court reached its decision by 
applying the substantive impossibility of performance of defense, which simply is inapplicable to 
this case. 
3. The Appropriate Remedy Is An Award Of Damages 
This Court has recognized on many occasions that the "usual measure of actual damages 
for a purchaser's breach of contract for sale of realty is the difference between the contract price 
and the market value of the property at time of breach, plus rental value for any period of 
possession by the purchaser." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261, 846 P.2d 
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904,912 (1993); see also Lawrence v. Franklin, 113 Idaho 895, 749 P.2d 1020 (Ct. App. 1988); 
Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 (1979). The Court has adopted the following 
analysis with regard to damages for breach of a real estate contract: 
The general rule applied where the purchaser under a real estate 
contract refuses to go through with his purchase is that he is liable 
for the vendor's loss of bargain, plus any appropriate consequential 
damages. This means the vendor will recover the difference 
between the market value and the contract price on the date of 
breach or on the date at which he regains possession of the land .... 
The rule is that the vendor's loss is measured by the market price of 
the property as of breach date, not the price he obtained on resale 
at a later date. The price obtained on resale may, however, be 
sufficient evidence of the market value at the date of breach, 
provided market conditions are similar and the time lapse between 
the date of breach and the resale is not great. 
Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261 (quoting Dobbs, HANDBOOK ON THE LA W OF REMEDIES, § 12.11 
p. 855). 
The measure of damages is clear, and specific performance of the Agreements to 
Purchase the Subject Properties is not appropriate in light of the availability of this legal remedy. 
'The basic, underlying rule is that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party has a 
plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295, 
410 P.2d 434 (1966). In Suchan, this Court held that the district court had abused its discretion 
in ordering specific performance in favor of the vendor of real estate because the vendor had an 
adequate remedy at law in the form of damages: 
It cannot be seriously contended that the remedy at law via 
damages was not adequate, plain, speedy, and complete in this 
case. Plaintiffs commenced the action thirty-seven days after 
execution of the contract. They had not taken possession of the 
property. There was no rental value, nor any depreciation or 
enhancement in the value of the property, to be considered. 
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Vendors' damages were readily ascertainable. They could have 
been made whole with a minimum of delay and inconvenience. A 
judgment for the amount determined would have ended the 
controversy promptly. 
Jd, 90 Idaho at 303. 
Those facts can be contrasted with the facts in Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 701 P.2d 
198 (1985), wherein the Court ordered specific performance of a real estate contract. In 
awarding specific performance, the Court focused on the fact that the house was of a "unique 
construction" and was "located in a seasonal recreation area with a limited marketing season." 
Jd, 108 Idaho at 583. More importantly, the house had substantially deteriorated due to the lack 
of occupancy and "the buyers had the lower level of the house altered and partially finished to 
their particular desires, and buyers had done substantial damage to the walls upstairs and down 
while attempting to discover building defects." Jd These facts would have made it difficult to 
calculate damages. Notably, in ordering specific performance, the Court specifically recognized 
that the order of specific performance was feasible in that the buyers "had sufficient cash (the 
proceeds from the sale of the Nevada property) to purchase the house." Jd 
Here, there is no reason Respondents would not be fully compensated by an award of 
damages. Mr. Mason breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties on December 
21, 2007, and the Respondents filed their Complaint just 31 days later. Damages can be easily 
calculated by ascertaining the value of the Subject Properties as of that date, and awarding 
Respondents the difference between that value and the contract price. There is no evidence that 
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any the Subject Properties are unique or have deteriorated in any way4 Thus, the standard 
measure of damages - the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject 
Properties as of December 21, 2007 - is the appropriate measure of damages. Given the 
availability of an adequate remedy, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order 
specific performance. 
4. The Order Of Specific Performance Results In A Windfall To Respondents 
The remedy ordered by the District Court is clearly inappropriate as it will result in a 
windfall to Respondents. The District Court entered a Judgment totaling almost $4.5 Million, 
which is the entire contract price of the Subject Properties, plus interest. Mr. Mason obviously 
cannot satisfy the Judgment. The Judgment further provides that Respondents have a valid, 
subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties and that said vendor's liens may be 
enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same manner and subject to the same 
restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree of foreclosure as set forth in 
Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Thus, Respondents will be able to satisfy the Judgment by 
foreclosing on their vendor's lien and having the properties sold at a foreclosure sale. When the 
Subject Properties are sold, Respondents will be entitled to a deficiency judgment. See Idaho 
Code § 6-108. That deficiency judgment will be measured by the difference between the total 
judgment and the "reasonable value" of the Subject Property on the date offoreclosure. 
4 Respondents may contend that Mr. Mason's actions resulted in a Kuna sewer LID (Local 
Improvement District) encumbrance on the Subject Properties in the amount of 
approximately $400,000. Any damages resulting from the LID encumbrance, however, are 
easily ascertainable and can be included as a measure of damages. 
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Respondents will likely credit bid a portion of the judgment and walk away with the Subject 
Property and a very large deficiency judgment. 
Upon first glance, the measure of the deficiency judgment may look similar to the 
standard measure of damages on breach of contract cases. Upon closer inspection, however, 
there is a substantial difference. The standard measure of damages for a breach of real estate 
contract is the "difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at time 
of breach." Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). In contrast, the measure of a 
deficiency judgment would be the difference between the total Judgment and the value of the 
Subject Properties at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Idaho Code § 6-108. The difference is 
likely substantial in light of the declining real estate values in Idaho. 
Mr. Mason agreed to purchase the Subject Properties on April 12, 2006, close to the 
height of the Idaho real estate bubble. He was in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the 
Subject Properties on December 21, 2007. By that time, the Idaho real estate bubble had burst, 
and real estate values were declining. The value of the Subject Properties as of December 21, 
2007 was certainly lower than the contract price, and the Respondents would be entitled to 
damages in the amount of the difference (likely hundreds of thousands of dollars). 
Since that time, however, real estate values have plummeted. By the time the Subject 
Properties are sold in a foreclosure sale, the value of the Subject Properties will almost certainly 
be much lower (likely hundreds of thousands, if not over a million, dollars). At the end of the 
day, the deficiency judgment against Mr. Mason will certainly be much higher than a damages 
judgment would have been. The deficiency judgment will be much larger than the difference 
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between the contract price and the value of the property at the time of the breach. Thus, 
Respondents will walk away with a windfall. 
C. The Order Of Attorneys' Fees Should Be Reversed 
If this Court reverses the order of specific performance, this case should be remanded to 
the District Court for a determination of an appropriate remedy at law. Upon remand, 
Respondent will no longer be the prevailing party. Respondent may be the prevailing party at 
some future time, but not until after an appropriate remedy at law has been ordered after remand. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is a standard, run-of-the-mill breach of contract case. Mr. Mason has never 
contested that he is in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties. Rather, the 
only issue in this case is the appropriate remedy for that breach. The appropriate remedy is the 
standard damages remedy - the difference between the contract price and the value of the 
property at the time of breach - that this Court has awarded on multiple occasions in connection 
with the breach of a real estate contract. By ordering specific performance, the District Court 
ignored the "basic, underlying rule ... that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party 
has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan, 90 Idaho at 295. 
Moreover, the District Court erred by failing to apply the correct legal principle that a court 
should not order an equitable remedy that is not feasible. Instead, the Court applied and rejected 
the inapplicable legal defense of impossibility of performance. For these reasons, Mr. Mason 
respectfully asks that this Court reverse the order of summary judgment and remand to the 
District Court with instructions to conduct proceedings to determine an appropriate remedy 
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measured by the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject Property at 
the time of breach. 4 
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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case is about the appropriate remedy to be applied in the case of a breach by the 
purchaser of a contract to purchase real estate. Rather than award the standard measure of 
damages recognized by this Court - the difference between the contract price and the value of 
the real estate at the time of breach - the District Court ordered specific performance of the 
contract. The District Court's order of specific performance is erroneous in that it ignored two 
fundamental rules of equity: (I) that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including 
specific performance, that is not feasible; and (2) that equity will not intervene where the 
aggrieved party has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law. 
B. Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
1. Background Of Mr. Mason 
Mr. Mason has been developing and building single-family and multi-family 
communities in Idaho for seventeen years. Since 1990, he has been involved in the development 
of approximately 30 single-family subdivisions and 8 multi-family projects. Each of those 
subdivisions/projects involved some element of bank or investor financing. See R., Exh. I 
(sealed)1 (Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~ 3). 
2. The Agreements To Purchase The Subject Properties, And Mr. Mason's 
Breach Of Those Agreements 
Many of the facts relevant to this case are taken from Mr. Mason's financial records, which 
are confidential in nature and are subject to a Protective Order entered by the District Court. 
The affidavits setting forth confidential financial information were filed under seal with the 
District Court and have been lodged with this Court as part of a sealed record. 
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On April 12, 2006, Mr. Mason entered into two separate Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreements. See R., Exh. 2 (Affidavit of Frank 1. Fazzio, Jr., "2-3). The first Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that Mr. Mason would purchase a residence and a parcel 
of real property on which the residence is located from Respondents Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio for the 
price of$I,530,000. [d. The second Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that 
Mr. Mason would purchase two parcels of real property consisting of farmland from Respondent 
Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, for the price of $2,000,000. [d. at' 4. Each Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement provided for a closing date of February 26, 2007. [d. Mr. Mason 
was not able to close on the purchase of the properties on February 26, 2007. [d. at, 6. Thus, 
Mr. Mason was in breach of both Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreements as of that date. 
The parties subsequently entered into two separate Agreements to Resolve Dispute 
Arising Out of Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement Dated April 12, 2006 (the "Agreements 
to Purchase the Subject Properties").2 Id. at' 9, Exhs. A-B. The Agreements to Purchase the 
Subject Properties provided that they superseded the original Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreements. [d. The terms of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties required 
Mr. Mason to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties by December 21, 2007 if Mason 
obtained plat approval by that date from the city of Kuna. [d. If plat approval was not obtained 
by December 21,2007, then Mr. Mason was required to close by March 21, 2008. Id. The city 
of Kuna approved the preliminary plat prior to December 21, 2007, but Mr. Mason was not able 
2 The properties that are the subject of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties are 
the same properties Mr. Mason had previously agreed to purchase and will hereinafter be 
referred to as the "Subject Properties." 
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to close on the purchase of the properties. ld. at 'if 11. Thus, Mr. Mason was in breach of the 
Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as of December 21, 2007. 
3, Mr. Mason's Inability To Close On The Purchase Of The Subject Properties 
At all times during the negotiations for the purchase of the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason 
believed that he would be able to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. The real estate 
market in Idaho was strong and bank andlor investor financing for real estate developments was 
readily available. Subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, however, 
there has been a significant downturn in the Idaho real estate market, property values have fallen, 
and the availability of financing for real estate developments has decreased substantially. See 
R., Exh. 1 (sealed) (Affidavit of Edward 1. Mason,. 'if'if 5-6). 
At all times subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason 
has made diligent efforts to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, he simply 
has been unable to do so because he cannot obtain the necessary financing. Attempts have been 
made to obtain financing from many different sources. See id. at 7-8. 
The original plan was to obtain financing through First Horizon Construction Lending 
("First Horizon"). First Horizon initiated an appraisal on the Subject Property, which indicated 
an "infeasibility issue with the project, in that the costs to acquire/develop exceed values 
generated." Furthermore, with the downturn in the Idaho real estate market, the Boise office of 
First Horizon closed in December 2007, laying off all employees, including its loan manager. 
Before going out of business in December 2007, after extensive financial documentation and 
meetings, First Horizon approved a financing package that required a high equity position. First 
Horizon agreed to finance just over $1,800,000 of the purchase price. When Mr. Mason was 
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unable to obtain an equity partner for the remainder ofthe purchase price, he informed 
Dr. Fazzio of the situation and requested that he agree to carry a portion of the financing through 
an owner-financing arrangement. Dr. Fazzio refused. See id. at 9. 
In January 2008, First Horizon announced that it was closing its national construction 
lending division and all pending loan financing was terminated. Thus, financing through First 
Horizon is no longer a viable option. See id. at 10-11. 
Mr. Mason also attempted to obtain financing through Eagle Equity Group, which is an 
investor group that has helped finance some ofMr. Mason's other developments. The Eagle 
Equity Group declined to finance the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 12. 
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through the RBC Builder Financial Group, 
which helped finance the acquisition and development of the Galiano Subdivision, a subdivision 
Mr. Mason is developing adjacent to the Subject Property. RBC informed Mr. Mason that no 
additional financing of a large subdivision would be approved due to the excess lot inventory and 
poor market conditions in the area. RBC announced in March 2008 that it was closing its 
western offices and that it would only have ongoing U.S. operations in the Southeast and Texas. 
Thus, financing in Idaho through the RBC is no longer available. See id. at 13. 
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Fred Berman, who has invested in 
many of his developments. Mr. Berman declined to invest in the project. See id. at 14. 
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Magnet Bank, which is currently 
financing one of his developments, the Ambleside subdivision. The Magnet Bank declined to 
help finance the purchase of the Subject Properties due to the depressed market conditions and 
the excess lot inventory and current financing of the Ambleside subdivision. In November 2007, 
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the Eagle Magnet Bank was shut down overnight with employees arriving to locked doors. See 
id. at 15. 
In February 2008, Mr. Mason attended a National Association of Homebuilders 
convention. Mr. Mason presented information regarding the financing of the Subject Properties 
to various banking and investor professionals attending the conference. He encountered a 
general lack of financing available for development projects due to the depressed real estate and 
financial markets. The only individual who expressed interest in the project was Meg Kelley, 
who is a Commercial & Resid~ntial Loan Officer with the Patriot National Bank in Stamford, 
Connecticut, and who also has ties to several independent investors and hedge funds. See id. at 
16. 
Mr. Mason provided additional information and financial documentation to Meg Kelley, 
but the Patriot National Bank was not interested in providing financing. However, Meg Kelley 
located an investor from New York that was interested in a conference call to discuss the project. 
Ted Mason Signature Homes, Inc. staff, Meg Kelley and the investor had a conference call to 
discuss feasibility. The investor reviewed the financial ratio requirements of investment as well 
as terms. Mr. Mason is not able to satisfy these high equity-to-debt ratios or liquidity 
requirements, so the investor was not interested in investing in any project at this time with 
Mr. Mason. In further conversations with Meg Kelly, she indicated that Mr. Mason and his 
companies would need to have a stronger balance sheet before national investors would be 
interested in reviewing specific projects. See id. at 17. 
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Mr. Mason has also spoken with three other private lenders: Hopkins Financial Services; 
Excelsior Management; and Seattle Funding Group, Ltd. Each of these private lenders would 
require an equity investor, which Mr. Mason has not been able to obtain. See id. at 18. 
Mr. Mason continues to look for a way to finance the purchase of the Subject Property. 
Indeed, he would still like to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, given his 
current financial situation, the depressed real estate market and the increasingly tightened credit 
market, there is no way he can close on the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 4, 19. 
Moreover, closing on the properties in question would not be made possible by 
liquidating assets. The vast majority of Mr. Mason's assets are in the form of real property, 
which serves as the collateral on bank loans. Not only would it be extremely difficult to sell that 
property under the current real estate market conditions, but in most cases Mr. Mason already 
owes the banks more than the appraised value ofthe property. Thus, liquidating those assets 
would not provide any cash with which to close on the properties. See R., Exh. 3 (sealed) 
(Supplemental Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~~ 3-11). 
In order to close on the Idaho Livestock Company, LLC property, Mr. Mason would need 
to have cash available in the amount of$2,000,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum. 
In order to close on the Fazzio property, Mr. Mason would need to have cash available in the 
amount of $1 ,530,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Thus, the total amount of 
cash that would be required to close on the Subject Properties is well over $3.5 Million. 
Mr. Mason does not have in his possession, nor does he have access to, the over $3.5 Million that 
would be required to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. See R., Exh. 1 (sealed) 
(Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~ 22). 
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If this Court were to affirm the District Court's Order of specific performance ordering 
Mr. Mason to close on the Subject Property, he simply will not be able to comply with that order. 
4. Procedural Posture 
Respondents filed the Complaint on January 22, 2008. R., p. 6-68. The Complaint 
alleged that Mr. Mason breached his contractual obligations under the Agreements to Purchase 
the Subject Properties. Respondents subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking 
the Court to either (l) confirm the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as arbitration 
awards; or (2) enter a judgment for specific performance. Specifically, Respondents requested a 
"Judgment for specific performance .... [rJequiring Mason to immediately close on the 
purchase ofthe Subject Properties." R., Exh. I, p. 10. 
Mr. Mason opposed the motion for summary judgment on grounds that specific 
performance should not be ordered because it would be impossible for Mr. Mason to close on the 
purchase of the subject properties. R., Exh. 2 (sealed). Mr. Mason relied on this Court's 
repeated recognition of the equitable rules that a court of equity should not order a remedy, 
including specific performance, that is not feasible and that an equitable remedy should not be 
ordered where there exists and adequate remedy at law. Mr. Mason did not contest the fact that 
he breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, nor did Mr. Mason assert the 
substantive impossibility of performance defense. Despite the fact that the substantive 
impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by Mr. Mason, the District Court, the 
Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the 
substantive impossibility of performance defense. R., Exhs. 4-5. Mr. Mason responded by 
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explaining that the substantive impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable to this case 
and is a different defense than that being asserted by Mr. Mason. R., Exh. 4. 
In a December 30, 2008 Order, Judge Sticklen granted Respondents' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, ordering that "[sJpecific performance on the contract is to be completed 
within thirty days of the date of this order; if not so accomplished, a judgment for the purchase 
price may be entered, upon satisfaction of which the properties must be conveyed to Mason." 
R., pp. 78-83. As Mr. Mason had previously made clear, he was unable to comply with the order 
of specific performance because he did not have the means to close on the Subject Properties. 
Mr. Mason appealed from the Order, but that appeal was dismissed as premature because 
a final judgment had not yet been issued. Mr. Mason then sought reconsideration of the Order, 
which was denied by the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood, who had since replaced Judge 
Sticklen. Judge Greenwood entered a final Judgment (the "Judgment") in favor of Respondents 
Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio in the principal amount of $1 ,530,000, plus interest in the amount of 
$412,471.08. See Order to Augment the Record, dated November 17, 2009, Exh. I. Judge 
Greenwood also entered Judgment in favor of Respondent Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, in 
the amount of $2,000,000, plus interest in the amount of $539, 177.66. Id. The Judgment further 
provides that Respondents have a valid, subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties 
and that said vendor's liens may be enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same 
manner and subject to the same restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree 
of foreclosure as set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Id. Judge Greenwood also 
awarded attorneys' fees and costs in favor of respondents in the sum of$36,999.50. See Order 
Granting Motion to Augment Record, dated October 6, 2009. 
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II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(1) Whether the District Court erred in ordering specific performance of the 
Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, where the Respondent had an adequate remedy 
at law and where the order of specific performance was not feasible. 
(2) Whether, upon reversal of the order granting specific performance, this Court 
should also reverse the award of attorney fees on grounds that Respondent is not the prevailing 
party.3 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review 
The Court reviews an order of specific performance for an abuse of discretion. Mallory 
v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119,123,594 P.2d 629, 633 (1979). When determining whether a district 
court abused its discretion, the Court considers three factors: "(I) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its 
3 Mr. Mason had initially indicated that he would be appealing the District Court's order of 
attorney fees with regard to the amount of the attorneys' fees award. After further review of 
the issue, Mr. Mason has elected not to pursue an appeal of the reasonableness of the 
amount of the attorney fees award and to focus this appeal only on the order of specific 
performance. Upon reversal of the order of specific performance, however, Respondent will 
not be the prevailing party, and the award of attorney fees should also be reversed as 
premature. 
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decision through an exercise of reason." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 
344 (2006). 
B. The District Court Erred In Ordering Specific Performance 
1. Specific Performance Is Not Appropriate Because It Would Not Be Possible 
For Mr. Mason To Comply With The Order Of Specific Performance 
"There is no legal right to specific performance." Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc. 
134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000). Instead, specific performance "is an extraordinary 
remedy that can provide relief when legal remedies are inadequate." Id "[S]pecific 
performance is an equitable remedy and should not be granted when it would be unjust, 
oppressive, or unconscionable." Id The decision to grant specific performance is a matter 
within the District Court's discretion. Id "When making its decision the court must balance the 
equities between the parties to determine whether specific performance is appropriate." Id 
In ordering specific performance, the District Court did not recognize, much less follow, 
the well-established rule that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including specific 
performance, which is not feasible. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 125,227 P.2d 
351,359 (1951), overruled on other grounds by David Steed and Associates, Inc. v. Young, 115 
Idaho 247, 766 P.2d 717 (1988) ("Equity will not enter a decree for specific performance the 
enforcement of which is not practicable or feasible. "); Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co., 
99 Idaho 740, 745-46, 588 P.2d 939, 944-45 (1978) (dismissing claim for specific performance 
because "[i]t is well established that the courts will not order the impossible"); Childs v. Reed, 34 
Idaho 450, 202 P. 685,686 (1921) ("Where the contract is of such a nature that obedience to the 
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deQree cannot be obtained by the ordinary processes of the court, equity will decline to 
interfere. "). 
It is indisputable that Mr. Mason does not have the approximately $3.5 Million that 
would be required to close on the SUbject Properties as ordered by the Court. See R., Exhs. I, 3 
(sealed). Thus, the District Court erred in ordering specific performance. 
2. The Equitable Rule That Equity Courts Should Not Order The Impossible Is 
Separate And Distinct From The Substantive Impossibility Of Performance 
Defense 
The rule that equity should not order the impossible is an equitable rule, not a substantive 
defense. Rather than apply the equitable rule, the Court applied and rejected the substantive 
contract defense of impossibility of performance as if the two rules were one and the same. The 
District Court's analysis was erroneous in that the two rules are not one and the same. The 
equitable rule merely precludes an order of equitable relief and leaves the plaintiff with a remedy 
in law, i.e., damages. See, e.g., Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 434 (1966) 
(reversing the district court's order of specific performance of a real estate contract, and 
remanding to the district court to calculate damages). In other words, the equitable rule cited by 
Mr. Mason goes not to the issue of liability, but to the issue of what remedy is appropriate. The 
substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is a complete defense to a contract and leaves 
the plaintiff with no remedy at all, either equitable or at law. See Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 
252,257,706 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the substantive doctrine of 
impossibility of performance results in the party asserting the defense being "relieved of his duty 
to perform") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (1981». 
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"The doctrine of impossibility operates to excuse performance when the bargained-for 
performance is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being performed due to the 
unforeseen, supervening act of a third party." Haessly v. Safeeo Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 
Idaho 463, 465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992). "A sine qua non for application of the doctrine is 
that the parties must have contracted, expressly or in necessary contemplation, with reference to 
continued existence of the specific thing as a condition essential to performance." Id. 
The above described impossibility of performance doctrine serves as a defense to a 
breach of contract claim. In other words, the impossibility of performance excuses the breach. 
However, Mr. Mason has not ever asserted impossibility of performance as a defense to 
Respondents' breach of contract claim because the authorities generally hold that financial 
inability to perform does not excuse a breach. Moreover, "impossibility that is only temporary 
will not act to discharge a contractual obligation if the contract can yet be performed after the 
impossibility ceases." Sutheimer v. Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 85, 896 P.2d 989, 993 (Ct. App. 
1995). Impossibility of performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is simply not 
an issue in this case. 
Despite the fact that the impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by 
Mr. Mason, Judge Sticklen asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the 
impossibility of performance doctrine in connection with Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. See R., Exhs. 3-4. Mr. Mason provided supplemental briefing on the issue, 
explaining the difference between the equitable rule that equitable courts should not order the 
impossible and the substantive defense of impossibility of performance. See R., Exh. 4. 
Mr. Mason expressly stated that he was not relying on the substantive impossibility of 
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performance defense. Id. at p. 3 ("Mr. Mason is not currently asserting impossibility of 
performance as a defense to Dr. Fazzio's breach of contract claim because the authorities 
generally hold that financial inability to perform does not excuse a breach. . .. Impossibility of 
performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is not at issue for purposes of 
Dr. Fazzio's motion for summary judgment."). 
Even though Mr. Mason specifically disclaimed any reliance on the substantive 
impossibility of performance defense, Judge Sticklen proceeded to grant Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment by concluding that the substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is 
inapplicable. Specifically, she explained: 
Furthermore, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently noted that 
"[m]ost importantly it is the task itself which must be impossible-
it is not enough that the particular promissor is unable to perform 
the task if it would be possible for a different promissor to 
perform." State v. Chacon, [146 Idaho 520, (Ct. App. 2008)]. 
While this case was criminal in nature, it is still persuasive Idaho 
dicta on the issue as it relates to the enforcement of contracts. 
R., p. 83; see also. id. at p. 82 (citing Christy v. Pilkington, 273 S.W. 2d 533 (Ark. 1954), for the 
proposition that the substantive defense of impossibility of performance does not apply to a 
"subjective impossibility" of performing). 
Mr. Mason does not disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the substantive 
impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable. Indeed, Mr. Mason conceded the point. 
The problem is that the District Court did not address the equitable rule that a court in equity 
should not order the impossible. 
In ordering specific performance, the District Court abused its discretion in that it applied 
the wrong legal principle. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 873 (explaining that, in 
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determining whether a district court has abused its discretion, the Court should look to whether 
the district court "acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable 
legal principles.") (emphasis added); see also State of Idaho v. Watkins, Idaho , P.3d 
. ---
_,2009 Opinion No. 151, Docket No. 35687 (December 24, 2009), wherein the Court defined 
"judicial discretion" to mean: 
the discretionary action of a judge or court ... bounded by the 
rules and principles of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, or 
unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, but the 
exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or 
the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the 
circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning 
the course prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of 
the judge, but to that of the law. 
Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY). 
Although applied in the context of the standard of review for evidentiary rulings, the 
principles guiding the exercise of judicial discretion in determining an equitable remedy should 
be the same. The District Court did not recognize, much less apply, the equitable rule that a 
court in equity should not order the impossible. Rather, the District Court reached its decision by 
applying the substantive impossibility of performance of defense, which simply is inapplicable to 
this case. 
3. The Appropriate Remedy Is An Award Of Damages 
This Court has recognized on many occasions that the "usual measure of actual damages 
for a purchaser's breach of contract for sale of realty is the difference between the contract price 
and the market value of the property at time of breach, plus rental value for any period of 
possession by the purchaser." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261,846 P.2d 
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904,912 (1993); see also Lawrence v. Franklin, 113 Idaho 895, 749 P.2d 1020 (Ct. App. 1988); 
Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 (1979). The Court has adopted the following 
analysis with regard to damages for breach of a real estate contract: 
The general rule applied where the purchaser under a real estate 
contract refuses to go through with his purchase is that he is liable 
for the vendor's loss of bargain, plus any appropriate consequential 
damages. This means the vendor will recover the difference 
between the market value and the contract price on the date of 
breach or on the date at which he regains possession of the land .... 
The rule is that the vendor's loss is measured by the market price of 
the property as of breach date, not the price he obtained on resale 
at a later date. The price obtained on resale may, however, be 
sufficient evidence of the market value at the date of breach, 
provided market conditions are similar and the time lapse between 
the date of breach and the resale is not great. 
Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261 (quoting Dobbs, HANDBOOK ON THE LA W OF REMEDIES, § 12.11 
p. 855). 
The measure of damages is clear, and specific performance of the Agreements to 
Purchase the Subject Properties is not appropriate in light of the availability of this legal remedy. 
"The basic, underlying rule is that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party has a 
plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295, 
410 P.2d 434 (1966). In Suchan, this Court held that the district court had abused its discretion 
in ordering specific performance in favor of the vendor of real estate because the vendor had an 
adequate remedy at law in the form of damages: 
It cannot be seriously contended that the remedy at law via 
damages was not adequate, plain, speedy, and complete in this 
case. Plaintiffs commenced the action thirty-seven days after 
execution of the contract. They had not taken possession of the 
property. There was no rental value, nor any depreciation or 
enhancement in the value of the property, to be considered. 
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Vendors' damages were readily ascertainable. They could have 
been made whole with a minimum of delay and inconvenience. A 
judgment for the amount determined would have ended the 
controversy promptly. 
[d., 90 Idaho at 303. 
Those facts can be contrasted with the facts in Perron v, Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 701 P.2d 
198 (1985), wherein the Court ordered specific performance of a real estate contract. In 
awarding specific performance, the Court focused on the fact that the house was of a "unique 
construction" and was "located in a seasonal recreation area with a limited marketing season." 
[d., 108 Idaho at 583. More importantly, the house had substantially deteriorated due to the lack 
of occupancy and "the buyers had the lower level of the house altered and partially finished to 
their particular desires, and buyers had done substantial damage to the walls upstairs and down 
while attempting to discover building defects," [d. These facts would have made it difficult to 
calculate damages. Notably, in ordering specific performance, the Court specifically recognized 
that the order of specific performance was feasible in that the buyers "had sufficient cash (the 
proceeds from the sale of the Nevada property) to purchase the house," [d. 
Here, there is no reason Respondents would not be fully compensated by an award of 
damages. Mr. Mason breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties on December 
21, 2007, and the Respondents filed their Complaint just 31 days later. Damages can be easily 
calculated by ascertaining the value of the Subject Properties as of that date, and awarding 
Respondents the difference between that value and the contract price. There is no evidence that 
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any the Subject Properties are unique or have deteriorated in any way.4 Thus, the standard 
measure of damages - the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject 
Properties as of December 21, 2007 - is the appropriate measure of damages. Given the 
availability of an adequate remedy, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order 
specific performance. 
4. The Order Of Specific Performance Results In A Windfall To Respondents 
The remedy ordered by the District Court is clearly inappropriate as it will result in a 
windfall to Respondents. The District Court entered a Judgment totaling almost $4.5 Million, 
which is the entire contract price of the Subject Properties, plus interest. Mr. Mason obviously 
cannot satisfy the Judgment. The Judgment further provides that Respondents have a valid, 
subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties and that said vendor's liens may be 
enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same manner and subject to the same 
restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree of foreclosure as set forth in 
Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Thus, Respondents will be able to satisfy the Judgment by 
foreclosing on their vendor's lien and having the properties sold at a foreclosure sale. When the 
Subject Properties are sold, Respondents will be entitled to a deficiency judgment. See Idaho 
Code § 6-108. That deficiency judgment will be measured by the difference between the total 
judgment and the "reasonable value" of the Subject Property on the date offoreclosure. 
4 Respondents may contend that Mr. Mason's actions resulted in a Kuna sewer LID (Local 
Improvement District) encumbrance on the Subject Properties in the amount of 
approximately $400,000. Any damages resulting from the LID encumbrance, however, are 
easily ascertainable and can be included as a measure of damages. 
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Respondents will likely credit bid a portion of the judgment and walk away with the Subject 
Property and a very large deficiency judgment. 
Upon first glance, the measure of the deficiency judgment may look similar to the 
standard measure of damages on breach of contract cases. Upon closer inspection, however, 
there is a substantial difference. The standard measure of damages for a breach of real estate 
contract is the "difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at time 
of breach." Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). In contrast, the measure of a 
deficiency judgment would be the difference between the total Judgment and the value of the 
Subject Properties at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Idaho Code § 6-108. The difference is 
likely substantial in light of the declining real estate values in Idaho. 
Mr. Mason agreed to purchase the Subject Properties on April 12, 2006, close to the 
height of the Idaho real estate bubble. He was in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the 
Subject Properties on December 21, 2007. By that time, the Idaho real estate bubble had burst, 
and real estate values were declining. The value of the Subject Properties as of December 21, 
2007 was certainly lower than the contract price, and the Respondents would be entitled to 
damages in the amount of the difference (likely hundreds of thousands of dollars). 
Since that time, however, real estate values have plummeted. By the time the Subject 
Properties are sold in a foreclosure sale, the value of the Subject Properties will almost certainly 
be much lower (likely hundreds of thousands, if not over a million, dollars). At the end of the 
day, the deficiency judgment against Mr. Mason will certainly be much higher than a damages 
judgment would have been. The deficiency judgment will be much larger than the difference 
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between the contract price and the value of the property at the time of the breach. Thus, 
Respondents will walk away with a windfall. 
C. The Order Of Attorneys' Fees Should Be Reversed 
If this Court reverses the order of specific performance, this case should be remanded to 
the District Court for a determination of an appropriate remedy at law. Upon remand, 
Respondent will no longer be the prevailing party. Respondent may be the prevailing party at 
some future time, but not until after an appropriate remedy at law has been ordered after remand. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is a standard, run-of-the-mill breach of contract case. Mr. Mason has never 
contested that he is in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties. Rather, the 
only issue in this case is the appropriate remedy for that breach. The appropriate remedy is the 
standard damages remedy - the difference between the contract price and the value of the 
property at the time of breach - that this Court has awarded on multiple occasions in connection 
with the breach of a real estate contract. By ordering specific performance, the District Court 
ignored the "basic, underlying rule ... that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party 
has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan, 90 Idaho at 295. 
Moreover, the District Court erred by failing to apply the correct legal principle that a court 
should not order an equitable remedy that is not feasible. Instead, the Court applied and rejected 
the inapplicable legal defense of impossibility of performance. For these reasons, Mr. Mason 
respectfully asks that this Court reverse the order of summary judgment and remand to the 
District Court with instructions to conduct proceedings to determine an appropriate remedy 
- 19 -
43464,0001.1793506,1 
measured by the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject Property at 
the time of breach. YL.<9 
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